
















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3717 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









We incorporate inequity aversion into an otherwise standard New Keynesian dynamic 
equilibrium model with Calvo wage contracts and positive inflation. Workers with relatively 
low incomes experience envy, whereas those with relatively high incomes experience guilt. 
The former seek to raise their income, and latter seek to reduce it. The greater the inflation 
rate, the greater the degree of wage dispersion under Calvo wage contracts, and thus the 
greater the degree of envy and guilt experienced by the workers. Since the envy effect is 
stronger than the guilt effect, according to the available empirical evidence, a rise in the 
inflation rate leads workers to supply more labor over the contract period, generating a 
significant positive long-run relation between inflation and output (and employment), for low 
inflation rates. This Phillips curve relation, together with an inefficient zero-inflation steady 
state, provides a rationale for a positive long-run inflation rate. Given standard calibrations, 
optimal monetary policy is associated with a long-run inflation rate around 2 percent. 
JEL-Code: E500. 
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 1 Introduction
Despite a well-known, growing body of empirical literature calling the classical
dichotomy into question, it is still the conventional wisdom in contemporary
macroeconomic theory that monetary policy is roughly neutral with respect to
aggregate employment and output in the long run. Even though the standard
New Keynesian model implies a non-neutrality due to time discounting and
ine¢ ciencies due to relative price instability, these long-run e⁄ects of monetary
policy are quantitatively small for reasonable values of the interest rate and low
in￿ ation rates (Ascari (1998) and Graham and Snower (2004)).1 This paper,
by contrast, o⁄ers a new rationale for long-run real e⁄ects of monetary policy,
resting on envy and guilt. We ￿nd that for reasonably calibrated values of
the relevant parameters, these long-run e⁄ects are substantial. This result has
important implications for the conduct of mo- netary policy. Our calibration
results suggest an optimal in￿ ation rate in the neighborhood of 2 percent.
In particular, we incorporate fairness considerations to an otherwise stan-
dard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of New Keynesian
type with Calvo nominal wage contracts and positive trend in￿ ation. In this
context, we show that the classical dichotomy (whereby nominal variables have
no long-e⁄ect e⁄ect on real variables) breaks down in an empirically signi￿cant
and theoretically novel way. Our rationale for the long-run non-neutrality of
monetary policy does not rest on money illusion, departures from rational ex-
pectations, or permanent nominal rigidities. Instead, we assume that people are
inequity-averse with respect to real incomes, following the seminal work from
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Accordingly, people
with relatively low income experience envy, whereas those with relatively high
income experience guilt. Both experiences generate disutility and, in according
with the evidence, the in￿ uence of envy is stronger than that of guilt.
In the presence of Calvo nominal wage contracts, higher in￿ ation implies
greater wage dispersion and thus greater dispersion of incomes, generating more
envy and guilt. Since people seek to mitigate envy and guilt, they adjust their
employment accordingly. Those who experience envy seek to raise their income
and do so by increasing their employment, where those who experience guilt
reduce their employment. Since the envy e⁄ect is stronger than the guilt e⁄ect,
higher in￿ ation is associated with greater employment and output, thereby ge-
nerating a long-run Phillips curve tradeo⁄.
In this context, we examine the welfare implications of our approach. We ￿nd
that the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate (maximizing steady-state, economy-wide
household utility) is positive, in the neighborhood of 2 percent for the standard
calibrations. This result is in stark contrast to earlier studies of DSGE mod-
els with trend in￿ ation (e.g., King and Wolman (1996), Kahn et al. (2003),
Yun (2005), and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007, 2010)), which ￿nd optimal
monetary policy to either be given by price stability or even by following a de-
1This holds true for the standard assumption of exponential discounting. Graham and
Snower (2008) show that hyperbolic discounting leads to a long-run trade-o⁄ of reasonable
magnitude.
1￿ ationary path. Our results are more in line with the aims of practical monetary
policy, as practiced by central bankers.
The the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant litera-
ture. Then section 3 describes our microfounded macro and calibrates it. Sec-
tion 4 presents the numerical implicatons of the model for the long-run Phillips
curve, discusses the underlying intuition, and investigates the sensitivity of the
results with respect to key parameters. Section 5 examines optimal monetary
policy in the presence of envy and guilt. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
Although evidence regarding verticality of the long-run Phillips curve had been
mixed over the past century, recent years have witnessed a rapidly growing
literature calling the classical dichotomy into question.2 As Gregory Mankiw
puts it "... if one does not approach the data with a prior view favoring long-run
neutrality, one would not leave the data with that posterior. The data￿ s best
guess is that monetary shocks leave permanent scars on the economy" (Mankiw
(2001), p. 48). This paper provides a new rationale for such empirical ￿ndings.
The paper also contributes to a growing theoretical literature explaining
how a non-vertical long-run Phillips curve can arise (surveyed, for example,
by Orphanides and Solow (1990)). In the context of state-dependent menu
costs, see Benabou and Konieczny (1994), Konieczny (1990), Kuran (1986),
and Naish (1986). There is also a literature that explains a long-run relation
between in￿ ation and employment in terms of fairness, either due to a permanent
downward nominal wage rigidity (money illusion) or to departures from rational
expectations (Akerlof et al. (1996), Akerlof and Dickens (2007)) and (Akerlof
et al. (2000)). Our analysis, by contrast, rests on neither nominal rigidities nor
non-rational expectations.3
2For the United States, see for example Beyer and Farmer (2007), Berentsen et al. (2011),
Favara and Giordani (2009), Karanassou et al. (2008), Karanassou and Sala (2010)) and
Russell and Banerjee (2008) for the United States. For a wider set of industrialized countries,
examples include Ball (1997, 1999), Ericson et al. (2001), Dolado et al. (2000), Fair (2000),
Fisher and Seater (1993), Gottschalk and Fritsche (2005), King and Watson (1994), Koutsas
(1998), Koutsas and Serletis (2003), Koutsas and Veloce (1996), Schreiber and Wolters (2007).
Empirical studies that study the Phillips curve in terms of the underlying structural macro
models include Ahmed and Rogers (1998), Bullard and Keating (1995), Coenen et al. (2004)
and Karanassou et al. (2003, 2005). Concerning developing and emerging countries, see Bae
and Ratti (2000) for Argentina and Brazil, by Wallace and Shelley (2004, 2007) for Nicaragua
and Mexico, by Puah et al. (2008) for Singapore, and by Chen (2007) for Taiwan.
3See also King and Wolman (1996), Ascari (1998), and Graham and Snower (2004), who
study the e⁄ects of trend in￿ation in New Keynesian models with nominal frictions and ￿nd a
long-run relation between the growth rate of money and steady state real aggregates. Amano
et al. (2007) discuss the in￿uence of trend in￿ation on business cycle characteristics such
as stochastic means, volatilities, and correlations of macroeconomic aggregates. Based on
a second order Taylor approximation around the deterministic steady state they ￿nd trend
in￿ation to decrease the mean of output while the variance and the persistence of output and
in￿ation increase. Finally, Graham and Snower (2008) derive a non-vertical Phillips curve
from hyperbolic discounting by households.
2The notion of fairness that we incorporate in a New Keynesian model is
based on inequity aversion. This phenomenon, covering both envy and guilt, is
supported by a massive empirical literature.4 A large body of empirical studies
in the behavioral economics literature argues that relative income substantially
matters for one￿ s subjective well-being.5 We model inequity aversion along the
lines of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In our
analysis, workers compare their real incomes with the average real income of all
the workers, feeling envy when their incomes are relatively low and guilt when
they are relatively high.6 Envy is stronger that guilt, a ￿nding supported by
much empirical evidence.7
The novel contribution of this paper is to examine the in￿ uence of such
inequity aversion on the Phillips curve. As noted, we ￿nd that this in￿ uence
implies a signi￿cant, positive long-run relation between in￿ ation and macroeco-
nomic activity for reasonably low in￿ ation rates (say, below 4 percent) and in
this context the optimal long-run in￿ ation rate is positive and near 2 percent.
This policy implication is noteworthy, since much of the previous literature on
optimal monetary policy suggests that prices should decline or remain stable in
the long run. According to the Friedman rule, the optimal rate of de￿ ation is
equal to the real interest rate. Models that include cash-in-advance constraints,
shopping time technologies, and frictions related to the transactional money de-
mand8 imply that the optimal in￿ ation rate exceeds the Friedman rule, but is
still negative. Other models focusing on the costs of price dispersion9 suggest
that the optimal in￿ ation rate is zero. Such policy implications are completely
at odds with the practice of monetary policy, where positive in￿ ation targets
commonly play a central role. In developed countries typically target low in￿ a-
tion rates in an interval from 2 to 3 percent, while developing countries often
apply target values which are slightly higher.10 There are few theoretical ratio-
nales for such practices.11 Against this backdrop, we provide a new justi￿cation
for positive in￿ ation targeting.
4See, for example, G￿th et al. (1982), Forsythe et al. (1994), Roth et al. (1991), Henrich et
al. (2001), Karni et al. (2008), and Cappelen et al. (2010, 2011). For surveys of the medical,
psychological and neuroeconomic background for this behavior, see Camerer et al. (2005),
Loewenstein et al. (2008). See also the neuroeconomic evidence of Sanfrey et al. (2003).
5For example, Argyle (1972, 1989), Easterlin (1974, 1995), Kapteyn and Van Herwaarden
(1980), van de Stadt et al. (1985), Scitovsky (1992), Clark and Oswald (1996), Solnick and
Hemenway (1998), Blanch￿ower and Oswald (2004), and Layard et al. (2009)). For a thorough
survey on the theoretical and empirical literature of the impact of level and relative income
on happiness refer to Clark et al. (2008).
6This idea draws on theory developed by the psychologists Homans (1961), Adams (1965)
and Walster et al. (1978).
7See, for example, Jaques (1956, 1961), Messik and Sentis (1979), and Loewenstein et al.
(1989)
8For example, King and Wolman (1996), Kahn et al. (2003), and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
(2007, 2010), Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) .
9For example, Gal￿ (2003) and Woodford (2003).
10See, for example, Roger and Stone (2005) and Carare and Stone (2006).
11An exception is Graham and Snower (2011), showing that optimal in￿ation is positive in
the presence of hyperbolic discounting by households. See also Fagan and Messina (2009) and
Coibion et al. (2010).
33 The Model Economy
As noted, we incorporate inequity aversion into a standard dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and positive trend in￿ ation.
Firms are perfectly competitive, while households are monopolistic competitors.
Workers are in￿nitely lived and located on the unit interval. Wages are ￿xed
according to the Calvo (1983) nominal contract scheme.12 The government
prints money, issues riskless bonds, and rebates seignorage gains in equal shares
to workers as a lump sum. It conducts monetary policy by controlling the growth
rate of nominal money supply Mt+1=Mt; which determines long-run in￿ ation13
￿t+1.
3.1 Firms
We assume a large number of identical ￿rms. Firms produces a homogenous
good according to a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) CES production function with











The parameter ￿ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the di⁄erent
labor types and yt is output. Cost minimization subject to the ￿rms production








where wj;t is the period-t real value of household j0s nominal contract wage set
in t. Due to perfect competition in the product market, ￿rms take wages and
prices as given and produce output at which the price equals marginal cost.
Thus the ￿rms￿markup is zero and the aggregate real wage is constant and
equal to unity.
3.2 Workers
Workers are monopolistic competitors, maximizing the utility subject to the
labor demand curves (2) that they face. Wages are ￿xed according to the
12In a subsequent paper, we also apply the Taylor (1979) staggered contracts scheme and
show that the results are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar across both approaches.
13See Nelson (2007, 2008). We choose money growth over an interest rate rule because, as
Reynard (2007) shows, the short term interest rate empirically fails to deliver accurate infor-
mation on subsequent in￿ation, while monetary aggregates have a much greater explanatory
power for the developments of subsequent in￿ation and output. This view is strongly sup-
ported by Favara and Giordani (2009). Karanassou and Sala (2010) argue that money growth
captures well the e⁄ects of changes in the short term interest rate on in￿ation, but also covers
additional stances of monetary policy such as banking regulations or possible transmission
e⁄ects of ￿scal measures on the yield curve.
4Calvo (1983) nominal contract scheme: in every period, a worker has probability
(1 ￿ ￿) to be allowed to reset her contract wage. The worker￿ s utility depends
positively on consumption cj;t and negatively on labor nj;t. In addition, the
worker dislikes to have more or less real income than the average. The worker
j￿ s utility function14 is



















where wk;t+i is the real value of the current wage of all other workers k. In
the spirit of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), worker j compares her real income




" for Ij;t < 0
￿ for Ij;t > 0 (5)
where " represents envy and ￿ represents guilt, under the standard restrictions
0 < ￿ < 1 and " > 0. Furthermore, " = ￿￿ where ￿ > 1; a phenomenon known
as egocentric bias.15
Worker j￿ s period-i budget constraint is







where m and b are real money and bond holdings and ￿ are net lump sum
transfers from the government to workers. When worker j is allowed to reset





















subject to her budget constraint (6) and her labor demand function (2). The
optimal wage sets the present value of the marginal disutility of labor (the
numerator) equal to the present value of the marginal utility of consumption






















14Karni and Safra (2002) derives an additively separable utility function from a set of basic
axioms.
15Messik and Senits (1979, 1985). Egocentric bias can be interpreted as Tversky and Kah-
neman￿ s (1991) loss aversion in social comparison.

























3.3 The General Equilibrium
The government prints money m, issues bonds b and gives direct transfers ￿ to
the workers. The government￿ s budget constraint is
mt+1+i + bt+1+i = Rt+ibt+i + mt+i + ￿t+i: (10)
The product market clears:
















Since we focus on the long-run relations between in￿ ation and real variables,
we consider the behavior of economic agents in the symmetric steady state. By
the aggregate wage index (13) in the steady state, the optimal reset wage (i.e.









The model contains three equations and three variables. The equations
comprise the reset wage (14), the labor supply (8), and the labor demand (2).
The variables are the reset wage, aggregate employment and aggregate output
fw￿;n;yg.
We solve the model numerically, along the following simple lines. The reset
wage (14) follows directly from the calibration. Substituting this into the labor
supply equation (8) yields the steady-state labor supply. Finally, the downward
sloping labor demand curve (2) together with the reset wage enables us to solve
for aggregate output.
6Parameter Symbol Value
Interest rate R 4%
Calvo probability ￿ 0.75
Elasticity of labor Substitution ￿ 5
implying wage markup 25%
Elasticity of labor supply ￿ 4
implying an inverse labor supply elasticity ￿ 0.25
Envy " 0.85
Guilt ￿ 0.32
Labor weight in utility function ￿ 1.05
implying share of work in steady state 33%
Table 1: Base Calibration
3.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model according to standard values in the literature. The
annual interest rate is 4 percent, equivalent to a quarterly discount factor ￿ =
0:99. Following Talyor (1999), nominal wages as asssumed to remain ￿xed for
one year, on average. Given that the Calvo pricing scheme follows a poisson
process, this average duration is generated by a Calvo parameter ￿ = 0:75,
representing the probability that the nominal wage remains unchanged during
the period of analysis. The elasticity of substitution among the di⁄erent types
of labor is ￿ = 5, implying a steady state wage markup of 25%, supported
by Graham and Snower (2011) and close to values reported by Ascari (2000),
Erceg et al. (2000), and Gal￿ et al. (2011). The parameter ￿ denotes the inverse
of the labor supply elasticity in the zero in￿ ation steady state.16 Following
Yun (1996) and empirical evidence from Imai and Keane (2004) and Ransom
and Sims (2010), we set the elasticity of labor supply to ￿ = 4, implying that
￿ = 0:25. Furthermore, following Ascari and Merkl (2009), the weight of labor
in the utility function ￿ = 1:05 is chosen so that workers work approximately
one-third of their available time endowment in the zero in￿ ation steady state.
Finally, we calibrate the parameters governing envy and guilt in accordance
with recent experimental evidence. Based on the results from the experimental
literature on ultimatum games, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) derive a distribution
for the envy and guilt paramters. Averaging the distribution yields ￿ = 0:32
and " = 0:85. These parameter values imply that envy times stronger than
guilt by a factor is ￿ = 2:7, identical to that supported by Loewenstein et al.
(1989).17 Table 1 summarizes our base calibration.
16Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Domeij and FlodØn (2006) show that ￿ is the intertem-
poral elasticity of labor supply. In particular, this elasticity measures the reaction of labor
supply to an intertemporal reallocation of wages, given a constant marginal utility of wealth.
A formal proof that ￿ = ￿￿1 holds in the zero in￿ation steady state can also be found in the
appendix.
17The authors ￿nd the disadvantageous part of the utility function to be approximately 2:7
times as steep as the advantageous part for neutral relationships.









Figure 1: Relation of In￿ ation to Real Variables
4 Results
Figure 1 presents the Phillips curve for the base calibration given in Table 1. On
the vertical axis we show the deviations of aggregate employment and output
from their respective values at the zero in￿ ation steady state. The horizontal
axis measures the steady state in￿ ation rate.18 This ￿gure implies that mone-
tary policy has substantial long-run real e⁄ects. Expansionary monetary policy
that raises in￿ ation from ￿ = 0% to ￿ = 2% is associated with an increase in
aggregate employment by 1:40 percent and in aggregate output by 1:32 per-
cent. (As we will show in Section 4.2, the positive relation between in￿ ation
and macroeconomic activity is almost entirely driven by the in￿ uence of envy
and guilt.) The expansionary e⁄ect of monetary policy declines as the in￿ ation
rate rises. For in￿ ation rates above around ￿ = 2:25%, further increases in the
rate of money growth lead to reduced aggregate employment and output.
4.1 Intuition
In our analysis, there are four channels whereby monetary policy a⁄ects output
and employment in the long run.
1. The employment cycling e⁄ect: When in￿ ation is positive, the real wage
falls over the contract period (since the nominal wage is constant over the
contract period while the price level rises). Under Calvo wage stagger-
ing, di⁄erent workers reset their nominal wages at di⁄erent times. For
those workers that have recently reset their nominal wages, the real wage
is relatively high; whereas those workers that have not done so, the real
18From Ascari (2004), Amano et. al (2007), and Bakhshi et. al (2007), we know that the
Calvo staggering scheme is inadequate for steady state in￿ation rates exceeding 5%. Therefore,
we restrict ourselves to in￿ation rates up to 5%.
8wage is relatively low. In short, in￿ ation is accompanied by ￿ uctuations of
relative wages. These ￿ uctuations lead to ￿ uctuations in relative employ-
ment rates across workers, as ￿rms substitute cheap labor for expensive
labor. Since di⁄erent workers are imperfect substitutes in production, this
substitution is ine¢ cient. The greater is the in￿ ation rate, the greater is
the amount of labor substitution and, due to the resulting ine¢ ciency, the
lower is aggregate output. In short, employment cycling implies an inverse
relation between in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity.
2. The labor smoothing e⁄ect: The greater the in￿ ation rate, the more the
worker￿ s labor supply varies over the cycle. Workers dislike variable labor
supply trajectories, since their marginal disutility of labor rises with labor
supplied. Thus a rise in in￿ ation leads to a rise in the average real reser-
vation wage over the contract period and thereby to a fall in employment
and output. So labor smoothing also yields an inverse relation between
in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity.
3. The envy-guilt e⁄ect: Workers experience relatively low incomes early in
the contract period and relatively high incomes later.19 Thus they experi-
ence envy early on. To reduce their disutility from envy, they reduce their
average wage so as to increase their average employment. Conversely,
they experience guilt later in the contract period, leading them to re-
duce average employment. But since envy is stronger than guilt, average
employment rises. The greater is the in￿ ation rate, the greater is the as-
sociated employment and output. Thereby the envy-guilt e⁄ect generates
a positive relation between in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity.
4. The discounting e⁄ect: As noted, at the beginning of the contract period
the worker￿ s real wage is relatively high and his employment is relatively
low, and conversely later on. The worker has a constant rate of time pref-
erence, and thus future utilities are discounted more heavily than present
utilities. So the relatively high marginal disutilities of work occuring late
in the contract period are discounted more heavily than the relatively low
marginal disutilities of work occuring earlier. Accordingly, the discount-
ing e⁄ect leads households to supply more labor. Furthermore, guilt (felt
late in the contract period) is more heavily a⁄ected by discounting than
envy (felt early in the contract period). Since guilt reduces labor supply
while envy stimulates it, the discounting e⁄ect leads to a further increase
in labor supply.
Needless to say, the latter discounting e⁄ect is complementary with the envy-
guilt e⁄ect. This complementarity is illustrated in Figure 2, where the upper two
Phillips curves portray the relation between in￿ ation (on the horizontal axis)
19Since workers are monopolistic competitors in the labor market, the elasticity of labor
demand is greater than unity at the utility-maximizing employment level. Thus the relatively
high real wages early in the contract period are associated with relatively low wage incomes.














Figure 2: The Complementarity between the Discounting and Envy-Guilt Ef-
fects
and employment and output (on the vertical axis) in the presence of both the dis-
counting and envy-guilt e⁄ects (as well as the other e⁄ects above), whereas the
lower two Phillips curves portray this relation in the absence of the discounting
e⁄ect. The vertical di⁄erence measures the size of the complementarity between
the discounting e⁄ect and the envy-guilt e⁄ect (with respect to employment and
output).
4.2 Sensitivities
Figure 3 shows the sensitivity of the Phillips curve with respect to a range of
values for the envy and guilt parameters that have been found in the literature.
Holding egocentric bias constant (￿, representing the relation between envy
and guilt: " = ￿￿), the left panel of Figure 3 shows the Phillips curve for the
following values of guilt parameter: ￿ 2 (0:24;0:32;0:39). Whereas our base
case is ￿ = 0:32, the value ￿ = 0:24 was supported by Fehr and Schmidt (2003)
and the value ￿ = 0:39 was found by Goeree and Holt (2000).20 Figure 3 shows,
not surprisingly, that when the guilt and envy e⁄ects strengthen the positive
long-run e⁄ect of monetary policy on output and employment increases.
The right panel of Figure 3 indicates that this positive e⁄ect rises with the
degree of egocentric bias, i.e. the greater the envy associated with any given
level of guilt, the more monetary policy stimulates output and employment in
the long run. This result is also not surprising in the light of the analysis above.
The ￿gure shows the Phillips curve for the following values of the egocentric
20Goeree and Holt (2000) estimate the Fehr and Schmidt paramters with experimental data
from a two stage-ultimatum game. Support for their estimates comes from Blanco et al.
(2011), who apply the same estimation methodology but resort to observations obtained from
utlimatum games, dictator games, public goods games, and prisoner￿ s dilemma games. They
￿nd the value ￿ = 0:38.































Figure 3: Sensitivity with respect to guilt parameters
bias parameter: ￿ 2 (1;2:7;3:5;5:1), where our base case is ￿ = 2:7. With the
exception of ￿ = 1, all values of the parameters were found in Loewenstein at
al. (1989). In particular, while ￿ = 2:7 was found for a neutral relationship be-
tween the judging subject and her reference subject, Loewenstein et al. (1989)
￿nd that ￿ = 3:5 and ￿ = 5:1 to apply to positive and negative relationship
environments, respectively. Moreover, to highlight the importance of the ego-
centric bias, Figure 3 also displays the results for ￿ = 1, i.e. in the abscence
of any egocentric bias. In this case, the envy and guilt e⁄ects play a negligible
role and therefore, monetary policy has no substantial positive implications for
long-run output and employment. This result holds irrespective of the value of
￿.
Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the Phillips curve with respect to reasonable
values for the labor supply and labor substitution elasticities ￿ = 1
￿ and ￿. The
left panel of Figure 4 juxtaposes Phillips curves for the labor supply elasticities
￿ 2 (1:5;4;9), where our base case is ￿ = 4 (￿ = 0:25). The higher labor supply
elasticitiy ￿ = 9 (￿ = 0:11) was estimated by Abowd and Card (1989) and the
lower value ￿ = 1:5 (￿ = 0:66) was found by Mulligan (1998) and Heckman et al.
(1998). The latter is very close to the values chosen by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996) and Hansen and Wright (1992) in their theoretical contributions. As is
apparent from the left panel of Figure 4, the lower the labor supply elasticity
(i.e. the higher ￿), the smaller the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy with respect
to aggregate employment and output. Intuitively, the greater the convexity
of utility with respect to labor, the more aversive are households to a non-
smooth path of labor supply and therefore, the stronger is the labor smoothing
e⁄ect.21 As discussed above, the labor smoothing e⁄ect raises the average real
reservation wage, thereby reducing employment and output. Consequently, the
Phillips curve shifts downwards.
21Furthermore, the higher ￿, the larger the weight of disutility of labor in the utility function


































Figure 4: Sensitivity with respect to elasticities
The right panel of Figure 4 shows how the long-run Phillips curve is a⁄ected
by the degree of labor substitutability over the interval ￿ 2 (1:5;5;10). The
higher the value ￿, the more substitutable are the labor types. We contrast our
base case ￿ = 5 with a very low degree of substitutability ￿ = 1:5 as estimated
by Ciccone and Peri (2005) and a high degree of substitutability ￿ = 10 as
found in Fagan and Messina (2009).22 As the right panel of Figure 4 indicates,
the more substitutable labor types are, the greater the real e⁄ects of monetary
policy, but over a narrower range. Intuitively, raising the substitutability of
labor types has three e⁄ects on aggregate. First, it reduces the ine¢ ciencies
from labor substitution, so that for a given the amount of employment cycling,
output increases. Second, labor substitution becomes cheaper, increasing the
incentive for employment cycling, so that output decreases23 (ceteris paribus).
Third, the increase in employment cycling raises the dispersion of incomes,
thereby eliciting more envy and guilt. Since the envy e⁄ect is greater than the
guilt e⁄ect, aggregate output increases (ceteris paribus). As is apparent from
the right panel of Figure 4, the positive e⁄ects on output (particularly from the
envy e⁄ect)24 are dominant at low in￿ ation rates, whereas the negative e⁄ects on
output (from additional employment cycling) are dominant at higher in￿ ation
￿. For ￿ = 0:66, ￿ increases from 1:05 to 1:65, while it decreases to 0:9025 for ￿ = 0:11.
22On the basis on various country studies, Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) summarize that the
average wage markup in industrialized as well as in developing countries lies in the intervall
between 10 and 25%, which implies 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ 10. The low value found by Ciccone and Peri
(2005) arises from the fact that they explicitely estimate the markup for high skilled workers
over low skilled workers.
23Employment cycling has a direct, negative e⁄ect on output, as well as an indirect, negative
e⁄ect via the households￿reservation wage (which rises because households￿utility falls when
employment cycling increases).
24As is apparent from Figure 6 in the appendix, the positive e⁄ects of a reduction in in-
e¢ ciencies from labor substitution are quantitatively negligible (left panel). Therefore, the
positive e⁄ect can be almost entirely attributed to the envy e⁄ect (right panel).














Figure 5: Figure 5: Sensitivity with respect to wage stickiness
rates.
Figure 5 shows the the Phillips curve for di⁄erent wage stickiness parameters
over the range ￿ 2 (0:66;0:75;0:88). While in our base calibration wages change
on average once a year (￿ = 0:75), Barattieri et al. (2010) ￿nd wages to be a
little less ￿ exible, i.e. wages change on average every six quarters (￿ = 0:82).
Christiano et al. (2005) estimate wages to be sticky for approximately half a
year (￿ = 0:66). Analogously to the previous ￿gure, Figure 5 indicates that the
stickier wages are, the more e⁄ective is monetary policy, but over a narrower
range. Intuitively, the stickier wages are, the larger is real wage dispersion and
thus the larger is real income dispersion. Consequently, there is more envy and
guilt, and since the envy e⁄ect is strong, output increases. On the other hand, a
larger real wage dispersion implies more labor substitution, which promotes the
employment cycling and thereby reduces output. The envy e⁄ect dominates at
low in￿ ation rates, whereas the employment cycling e⁄ects dominates at high
in￿ ation rates.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy
In the long run, the optimal rate of money growth (equal to the optimal in￿ ation




















subject to the labor demand contraint (2), the labor supply constraint (8), and
the reset wage (14).
The following table presents the optimal in￿ ation rates for our base calibra-
tion, as well as for other values of the envy-guilt parameters. Recalling that in
13￿ = 0:24 ￿ = 0:32 ￿ = 0:39
￿ = 2:7 1.69% 1.80% 1.92%
￿ = 3:5 1.97% 2.16% 2.30%
￿ = 5:1 2.47% 2.76% 2.97%
Table 2: Welfare with respect to envy and guilt
the base case ￿ = 2:7 and ￿ = 0:32, we ￿nd that optimal in￿ ation is slightly
below 2 percent in our base calibration. The higher value of the guilt parameter
(with constant egocentric bias) implies a slightly higher optimal in￿ ation rate,
and conversely for a lower value of the guilt parameter. Furthermore, greater
egocentric bias (with a constant guilt parameter) implies higher optimal in￿ a-
tion, and conversely for less egocentric bias.
The intuition underlying these results is straightforward. The optimal in￿ ation
rate is positive for two reasons: (1) When the in￿ ation rate is zero, output and
employment are ine¢ ciently low, since workers are monopolistic competitors
in the labor market. (2) Due to the envy-guilt and discounting e⁄ects, higher
in￿ ation is associated with greater output and employment, over a range of low
in￿ ation rates. On this account, a positive long-run rate of money growth is
able to reduce the ine¢ ciency from monopolistic competition.
More precisely, when the money growth rate rises above zero, it a⁄ects wel-
fare in the following ways: (1) it reduces the ine¢ ciency from monopolistic
competition and thereby raises the utility from consumption, (2) it raises the
ine¢ ciency from employment cycling, (3) it increases the disutility of labor due
to a more volatile labor trajectory and (4) it increases the disutility from envy
and guilt. While the ￿rst in￿ uence enters the utility function linearly in out-
put, the other in￿ uences grow exponentially as in￿ ation increases output and
employment. Thus the ￿rst in￿ uence dominates at low in￿ ation rates, whereas
the latter in￿ uences dominate at higher in￿ ation rates.
Needless to say, the ine¢ ciency from monopolistic competition can be re-
duced in ways other than expansionary monetary policy and these other ways
may have more favorable welfare e⁄ects than expansionary monetary policy.
But the overarching implication of our analysis is this. If, for whatever rea-
son,25 the equilibrium levels of output and employment are ine¢ ciently low ￿
after the government has implemented all its ￿scal and structural policies ￿
then expansionary monetary policy can be welfare-promoting by reducing the
residual ine¢ ciency.
shows how the optimal in￿ ation rate varies with respect to di⁄erent values26
for the intertemporal and intratemporal labor substitution elasticities ￿ and ￿;
respectively, and the degree of wage stickiness ￿.
Table 3The ￿rst two rows of Table 3 indicate that the optimal in￿ ation
rate is negatively related to the inverse of the labor supply elasticity ￿ = ￿￿1.
25There are of course many conceivable reasons why output and employment may be too
low, such as distortionary taxes, e¢ ciency-wage, insider-outsider, or union-power e⁄ects.
26We use the values chosen in the sensitivity analysis.
14￿ = 0:24 ￿ = 0:32 ￿ = 0:39
alternative ￿:
￿ = 0:11 2.31% 2.53% 2.67%
￿ = 0:66 0.92% 0.97% 1.01%
alternative ￿:
￿ = 1:5 3.23% 3.30% 3.45%
￿ = 10 0.96% 0.97% 0.99%
alternative ￿:
￿ = 0:66 1.93% 2.14% 2.18%
￿ = 0:82 1.51% 1.59% 1.65%
Table 3: Welfare with respect to model parameters
Intuitively, when the convexity of utility with respect to labor rises, the disutility
of work increases relative to the utility of consumption. Since the bene￿ts of
extra output decline more rapidly, reducing the optimal in￿ ation rate.
The next two rows of Table 3 show that the greater the substitutability
among labor types, the lower is the optimal in￿ ation rate. The degree of substi-
tutability measures the market power of the di⁄erent worker types. The lower
￿, the higher is the market power of each labor type, and thus the larger is the
ine¢ ciency from monopolistic competition, implying a lower optimal in￿ ation
rate.
Finally, the last two rows of Table 3 indicate that the greater is the degree of
wage stickiness, the lower is the optimal in￿ ation rate. Intuitively, the greater is
the degree of wage stickiness the more dispersed is the real wage distribution and
the greater is employment cycling. This reduces utility due to the ine¢ ciency
of employment cycling, households￿aversion to volatile incomes, and the envy
and guilt e⁄ects. Thus the optimal in￿ ation rate falls.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that, in the presence of staggered, monopolistically competi-
tive nominal wage contracts, inequity aversion can generate a positive long-run
tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity. Under these circum-
stances, our analysis implies that expansionary monetary policy ￿leading to a
low, positive in￿ ation rate ￿is socially optimal. For our base calibration, the
optimal in￿ ation rate is just under 2 percent.
Our analysis is meant to help bridge the gap between monetary theory and
central banking practice. In contrast to much of the recent literature on mon-
etary policy, we provide a rationale for targeting in￿ ation at a low, positive
rate.
In our analysis, the relation between in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity is
the outcome of four phenomena: employment cycling, labor supply variability,
discounting and envy-guilt e⁄ects. The ￿rst two phenomena imply an inverse
15relation between in￿ ation and macroeconomic activity, whereas the last two
are complementary and imply a positive relation. Furthermore, the last two
dominate at low in￿ ation rates, whereas the ￿rst two dominate at high in￿ ation
rates. Consequently, the Phillips curve is backward-bending, so that increases
in money growth lead to higher employment and output at low in￿ ation, but to
lower employment and output at high in￿ ation.
In this context, the role of optimal monetary policy is to reduce ine¢ cien-
cies that generate suboptimally low employment and output. This provides a
rationale for a low, positive long-run in￿ ation target.
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23Appendix
6.1 Steady State Relative Wage
To calculate the steady state we drop the time indices. The detrended wage












In the steady state we drop time indices








1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)
￿￿1
￿
W1￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)W￿1￿￿ (18)


































= (1 ￿ ￿)w
￿￿











= (1 ￿ ￿)w
￿￿












= (1 ￿ ￿)w
￿￿
k;t + ￿(1 + ￿)￿st￿1 (26)
24which in the steady state is given by
s = (1 ￿ ￿)w
￿￿





1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)￿: (28)
Derivation of Labor Supply Curve





















subject to its budget constraint







where m and b are real money and bond holdings and ￿ are lump sum transfers



















where N denotes the average income in the economy. The ￿rst order condition









(1 + ￿)i + ￿Vn
nj;t+i
wj;t

















































25From the utility function














Uc = 1; (38)
ZI =  j;t+iIj;t+i (39)
Plugging equations (37), (38), and (39) into (35) gives the optimal reset wage






















￿￿1 denotes the markup. This is equation (8) in Section 3. Rear-






















Note that envy and guilt needs to be considered separately, i.e. the term to the



























where ￿ denotes the threshold at which the worker exceeds the average income
in the economy and  j;t is an indicator function, which takes values
 j;t =
￿
" for Ij;t < 0
￿ for Ij;t > 0 : (43)
Applying the downward sloping labor demand equation (31), we can write equa-






































































































In order to be able to solve the model numerically, we need to let the in￿nite
sums converge. The sum formulation in the numerator can be written in terms




1￿x. In the case of the
denominator this is a lot more complicated. Remember that there is a kink due
to envy and guilt, which we need to account for. Therefore, let us look at the














￿￿ (1 + ￿)
(￿￿1)
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that  j;i =
￿
" for i < ￿ ￿ 1






































































27The sum formulation can be written in terms of (in-)￿nite geometric sums ac-
















￿￿ (1 + ￿)
2(￿￿1)
￿￿




￿￿ (1 + ￿)
(￿￿1)
￿￿






￿￿ (1 + ￿)
2(￿￿1)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ (1 + ￿)
2(￿￿1) ￿ ￿y
￿
￿￿ (1 + ￿)
(￿￿1)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ (1 + ￿)
(￿￿1)
Plugging equation (51) back into equation (46) and applying the convergence






























Note that for zero steady state in￿ ation the envy and guilt parts cancel each
other out and vanish.
￿￿1

















In this section we give proof of the inviability of the original version of Fehr
and Schmidt￿ s (1999) utility function in our model setup. We show that for
zero in￿ ation, the model does not break down to the standard NKM with trend
in￿ ation.
Assume a utility function analogous to equation (3), only with inequity aver-
sion entering linearly as suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).





￿  j;tIj;t (54)
Income inequality Ij;t is again de￿ned by equation (4). Under linear inequity
aversion Ij;t changes signs, depending on the position in the income distribution,
i.e. Ij;t < 0 for having a lower than average real income and Ij;t > 0 for having
a higher than average real income. To make sure that inequity aversion always
28enters utility negatively, we calibrate the envy and guilt parameters according
to the following scheme:
 j;t =
￿
￿" for Ij;t < 0
￿ for Ij;t > 0 : (55)









































































￿￿ (1 + ￿)
(￿￿1)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ (1 + ￿)
(￿￿1) + ￿
￿
￿￿ (1 + ￿)
(￿￿1)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ (1 + ￿)
(￿￿1): (59)






















Note that this equation breaks down to the standard version only if we assume
envy and guilt to be absent, i.e. " = ￿ = 0. In case of zero in￿ ation there is no
envy and guilt due to the fact that there is no wage dispersion.
￿￿1









However, equation (60) still inhabits the second component in the denomina-
tor, governing the disutility from inequity aversion. Therefore, envy and guilt
in￿ uence the steady state even when there is no envy and guilt in action. From
this we conclude that the linear version of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility
function is not viable in our standard DSGE model.
29The Welfare Function
Usually, one needs to take the per-period utility and plug in the expressions
cj = y(￿) and nj = sy(￿), with s being the price dispersion and y(￿) being
the optimal output which I have derived from my optimization problem, i.e.
the Phillips curve. Hence, the optimal in￿ ation rate is the value ￿ which gives
me the max utility. This approach cannot be implemented in the model with
envy and guilt as well. The problem that arises with this procedure in the envy
model is, however, that the per period utility function is not stable across time.
















where the latter term is time dependent. If you reset your wage, you feel envy.
On the other hand, if you haven￿ t reset your wage for a while, you feel guilt.
So there is a discontinuity in the utility function with respect to time, which
causes  j;t to take two di⁄erent values. I can overcome this problem by putting
























































































applying the de￿nition of inequity I, dropping time indices and re-writing the
























￿￿ (1 + ￿)
2(￿￿1)
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￿￿1
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￿￿ (1 + ￿)
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￿￿1
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1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿(1+￿) ￿
y(￿)2
2
["a(￿) + ￿b(￿)] (67)
Now we can again plug in y(￿) and ￿nd the maximizing in￿ ation rate.
6.3 The labor supply elasticity
The labor supply elasticity is the labor supply elasticity, holding the marginal
utility of wealth constant. It is the elasticity most papers and the empirical
￿ndings refer to. In the zero in￿ ation steady state (where there is no envy
and guilt and hence, we can omit the income inequality term from our utility














ct + mt+1 + bt+1 = wtnt + rtbt + mt
with the FOC￿ s
@L
@c
= Uct ￿ ￿t = 0
@L
@n

































































































given our utility function











































































Figure 6: Sensitivity with respect to substitution elasticity
33